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POWER TO MAKE RULES
POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO MAKE
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE *
T HE passage by Congress of the Act of June i9, 1934, confer-
ring rule-making power upon the Supreme Court of the
United States in actions at law in the United States courts, together
with power to unite the law and equity procedures in those courts,'
marks the climax of a long contest not without its dramatic fea-
tures. Attack upon the principle of conformity at law to state
practice developed at an early date, and twenty-four years ago the
American Bar Association took up the fight for a single uniform
system to be developed by the Court. This aroused a determined
legislative opposition, because of the fear that a complicated prac-
tice, the outgrowth of crowded urban dockets, might be forced
upon the entire country. At length, in 1933, the Association with-
drew from the battle to the extent of dismissing its Committee on
Uniform Judicial Procedure. Its chief opponent in Congress had
been Senator Walsh of Montana, and on his death, which oc-
curred after he had been offered and had accepted the Attorney
* Acknowledgment is made of the valuable assistance, in the preparation of
this article, rendered by Messrs. James William Moore, Edward C. Jaegerman, and
Ferdinand F. Stone, Assistants to the Reporter of the Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of the United States.
1 48 STAT. io64 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §§ 723b, 723c (1935). The Act provides:
"Be it enacted. .. . That the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States
and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, plead-
ings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules
shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.
They shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws
in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
"Sec. 2. The court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it
for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil
action and procedure for both: Provided, however, That in such union of rules the
right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment
to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such united rules
shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney
General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such
session.
"Approved, June ig, 1934."
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Generalship of the United States, there remained no real, active
opposition. On the contrary, his successor, the new Attorney
General, Homer S. Cummings, favored the legislation, undertook
support of the Association's bill, and pressed it with such vigor
that the bill became a law within three months after he had an-
nounced his intention of having it introduced, and this without
any opposition or discussion.'
Although the satisfaction of having achieved the ultimate vic-
tory was thus denied the Association, it is entitled to the credit
for its long campaign of education which made the result possible,
and it is responsible for the form of the Act itself.3 It is common,
in construing legislation, to speak of the "intent of the legisla-
ture ", and to cover with that blanket phrase a multitude of
considerations which dictated the substance and the form of the
legislation. But at least in this case where the statute was enacted
without any real discussion, such intent must be traced to the
Association's draftsmen. Their general purpose abundantly ap-
pears in the extensive annual reports of the Association's Com-
mittee. The failure of the Conformity Act to achieve the end of
real conformity to state practice, particularly in the trial and
appellate stages, the resulting conflicts of systems, the desirability
of uniformity, and the success of the Federal Equity Rules pro-
mulgated by the Court in 1912 are all stressed in these reports;
2 For this history, see Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-
L The Background (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 387; and compare also, Clark, The Chal-
lenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure (1935) 20 Co N. L. Q. 443; Sunderland,
Character and Extent of the Rule-Making Power Granted U. S. Supreme Court and
Methods of Effective Exercise (i935) 23 A. B. A. J. 404; Sunderland, The Grant of
Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States (1934) 32 McH.
L. REv. i16; Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United States Supreme
Court (1934) 13 Tszx. L. REv. i; Jaffin, Federal Procedural Revision (1935) 21
VA. L. Rav. 504; Dobie, Recent Developments in Federal Procedure (1935) 21 id.
876.
3 The first section of the Act dealing with actions at law was formulated at the
beginning of the Association's campaign. See H. R. 133, H. R. REP. No. 462, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 6559 (Committee on judiciary, 3914); (1913) 38 A. B. A.
RxP. 541. The second section, providing for the union of law and equity, was added
to the bill as a result of an address made before the Association in 1922 by Chief
Justice Taft, urging the inclusion of power to make such union. See Taft, Three
Needed Steps of Progress (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 34, 35; Taft, Possible and Needed
Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal Courts (1922) 8 id. 6or, 604, 607;
(3922) 47 A. B. A. REP. So, 82, 250, 259-63, 268; (1924) 49 id. 485, 496; S. 2060,
SEN. RU. No. 362, 68th Cong., xst Sess., Ser. No. 8220 (Committee on Judiciary,
1924). The exact wording of the Act goes back to 1924. Ibid.
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and the hope is expressed that complete rule-making authority
in the Court may result in establishing a system which will serve
as a model for further procedural reform in the various states.
Uniformity instead of conformity, a simple flexible system of
practice at least as effective as that of federal equity, and court
leadership in developing a procedural system- these were the
objectives towards which the Act was directed.- It is in the light
of the general purposes thus expressed that certain problems not
completely answered by the Act itself must be examined, and
among them is included the power of the Court to make rules of
appellate procedure, which is the chief topic of this paper.
The task of accomplishing these purposes is not a small one.
Even though conformity had largely failed as an actual basis of
federal practice,' it still served as a comforting theory to the bar,
which was coming more and more to fear that practice as an oc-
cult science understood only by the experts. And the far flung
nature of the judicial establishment of the United States, oper-
ating as it does in localities subject to conflicting state codes,
multiplies the number of those traditionally in opposition to
changes in procedures with which they are familiar. But the new
step comes at an opportune time. The continued support of the
American Bar Association assures the friendly co6peration of a
large and influential section of the profession. The federal Equity
Rules of 1912 have demonstrated the workability of modern
theories of practice, developed largely in the light of English ex-
4 These appear each year from 1913 to 1930 in 38-54 A. B. A. REP. Cf., e.g.,
(1926) 51 A. B. A. REP. 505, 519-22; reports cited note 3, supra. For creation of the
Committee, see (1912) 37 id. 35, 434-35; for its discharge, see (1933) 58 id. iio.
After the death in 193o of Mr. Thomas W. Shelton, its chairman since 1912, its
activities lessened. Cf. (1930) 55 id. 9'; (1932) 57 id. I8-19, 575; Clark and
Moore, supra note 2.
G Under the Conformity Act, federal practice conforms only "as near as may
be" to the state practice where the federal court is held. X7 STAT. x96 (872),
Rxv. STAT. (1878) § 914, 28 U. S. C. § 724 (i935). The Act was held not to apply
in general to matters of trial or of appeal and to matters regulated by Federal
Constitution or federal statute. Regulation by Congress has been constantly ex-
tended. In result there existed until i915 at least three federal practices at law
and equity - conformity in part at law, an overriding and extending federal sys-
tem at law, and a uniform equity. As a result of legislation in x915, which tended
to coalesce federal law and equity, there was added another -an expanding sys-
tem of united law and equity. See Clark and Moore, supra note 2, and the other
articles cited in that note.
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perience, which include free joinder of claims, counterclaims, and
of parties, extensive powers of amendment, and general flexibility
of administration under the direction of the court.6 Such general
principles of procedural reform have become reasonably well
settled. All the states have undertaken some reform of civil
procedure; nearly all, including finally in 1934 that last strong-
hold of common law pleading, Illinois, have modernized their
procedure fairly successfully and along lines which, superficial
distinctions aside, are surprisingly similar; and in many states,
including the largest industrial states, the interest in reform,
stimulated by judicial councils or commissions on the administra-
tion of justice, is real, active, and continuous.' Now, more than
at any time before, the objectives of the new federal legislation
seem susceptible of achievement with great success.
The Supreme Court has, in effect, by its order of June 3, 1935,
appointing an Advisory Committee of 14 to assist it in the formu-
lation of the proposed new rules,8 recognized the worth of judicial
councils as an aid to procedural reform. In fact the principle
has been carried further, to the extent of including suggestions
from the bar of the entire country; for under the leadership of
the Chief Justice and the Attorney General, and before the Ad-
visory Committee was chosen, district committees were created in
the various federal districts to make suggestions as to the form
which the rules should take. These committees functioned effi-
ciently and devotedly, and their suggestions were extensive and
detailed.' They are now to have the opportunity to pass on the
6 See Lane, Twenty Years under the Federal Equity Rules (1933) 46 HIARv.
L. REv. 638, and his earlier articles, Federal Equity Rules (1922) 35 id. 276, Work-
ing under Federal Equity Rules (1915) 29 id. 55, and One Year under the New
Federal Equity Rules (1914) 27 id. 629; Talley, The New and the Old Federal
Equity Rules Compared (1913) 18 VA. L. Rzv. 663; Clark and Moore, A New
Federal Civil Procedure-I. Pleadings and Parties (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1291;
articles cited note 2, supra.
7 The reports of the judicial councils of the various states are summarized in
the journal of the American judicature Society as they appear. See in particular
the reports of the judicial Council of New York for 1934 and 1935, the reports
of the Law Revision Commission of New York for the same period, as well as
the reports of the earlier New York Commission on the Administration of justice.
a 295 U. S. 774, 775 (X935).
9 All of these suggestions were carefully considered by the Advisory Com-
mittee in preparing its Preliminary Draft. See note lo, infra. For the appoint-
ment of the district committees, see Clark, supra note 2, at 447, 448; (1935)
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preliminary draft of the rules which the Advisory Committee
submitted to the Court on May i, 1936; for the Court, upon
recommendation of the Committee, ordered the rules printed at
once, and in advance of approval by it, in order that criticism
of the draft might be received and considered by the Committee
before final consideration of the rules by the Court."0 This affords
an unusual and a most interesting experiment in widespread par-
ticipation in rule-making activities. In fact it may afford a real
test, a yardstick so to speak, of the capacity of the profession
itself to adjust its court practices to changing conditions. And
if, as may be hoped, it demonstrates the value of rule making, it
will suggest also that further changes in federal procedure shall
be made as occasion arises in the same way in which the original
reform has been accomplished."
It is important to keep in mind the general objectives of the
Act; for its wording presents several problems, and a narrow ap-
proach to their solution may easily result in defeat of those ob-
jectives. One of the most important is that presented for ex-
amination in this paper, namely, whether rule-making authority
exists in the Court as to procedural details of appellate review.
If such authority does not exist, there will be a serious lacuna,
i8 J. Am. Jtn. Soc. 163; (1935) 20 MAss. L. Q. 41-44; (1934) 2o A. B. A. J.
713-16.
10 PRELh A.Y DRAP OF ADvSORY COMMITTEE, FEDERAL RULEs OF Civ,
PRo EDURE (May 1, 1936), consisting of ninety-four rules with annotations. See
address of Chief Justice Hughes before the American Law Institute, May 7, 1936,
(1936) 3 U. S. L. Wanx 881. It is hoped that the rules may be approved by the
Court and reported to Congress, Jan. 1, 1937, and take effect on or about Sept. i,
1937.
21 The Advisory Committee has suggested that the Court consider an addi-
tional rule establishing a standing committee on rules, in accordance with the
views of text writers. See ROSENBAxTr, THE RuJLE-MA=G AuaoRamr (1917)
21 et seq.; Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (I92I) 35 HARV. L. REv. II3; Sunder-
land, The Machinery of Procedural Reform (1924) 22 vficir. L. REV. 293; Lane,
Federal Equity Rules, and Twenty Years wnder the Federal Equity Rules, supra
note 6, stating that there is a need for some simple and inexpensive method of
bringing a rule before the Supreme Court for interpretation or modification. Wis.
STAY. (1935) § 251.18, the constitutionality of which was upheld in In re Constitu-
tionality of Statute Empowering Supreme Court to Promulgate Rules Regulating
Pleading, Practice, and Procedure in Judicial Proceedings, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W.
717 (193), presents an interesting example of rules of practice which supplant
state laws and of a permanent rules committee.
As to the power to amend the rules, see p. 1309, infra; note 18, infra.
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even over the system presented by the federal equity rules; and
serious complications in the union of law and equity will occur.
There are like difficulties as to several other matters about to be
stated; but as developed more at length hereinafter, the past
history of federal rule making and the decisions of the Court add
some additional support to the authority as applied to appellate
procedure.
The problems arise in large part because the two sections of the
Act were drafted at different times and were not thoroughly
cobrdinated.'2 The first, or earlier, section gives the Court
"power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of
the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the prac-
tice and procedure in civil actions at law ", without, however,
violation of the substantive rights of any litigant; and "such rules
shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and there-
after all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force
or effect." The second, or later, section provides that the Court
"may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for
cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one
form of civil action and procedure for both", provided that the
jury trial right be preserved inviolate; and "such united rules
shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Con-
gress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular ses-
sion thereof and until after the close of such session." Is
The Court has already determined " to proceed with the prepa-
ration of a unified system of rules for cases in equity and actions
at law, ' so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for
both,' so far as this may be done without the violation of any
substantive right." '" These problems arise: (i) what is the
function of Congress as to the rules adopted by the Court; (2)
can the rules be amended from time to time, and, if so, must
the amendments be reported to Congress in like manner to the
original rules; (3) does the power to supersede "all laws in con-
flict" with the rules granted under the first section as to the rules
12 See note 3, supra.
Is See note I, supra.
14 Address of Chief Justice Hughes before the American Law Institute, May 9,
1935, 55 Sup. Ct. xxxv, xxxviii, xxxix, (1935) 2 U. S. L. WB x 866, 88o.
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for " civil actions at law" carry over and apply to the " uniting"
of the rules " for cases in equity with those in actions at law,"
and the resulting " united rules "; and (4) does rule-making
authority exist in the Court as to certain matters not specifically
mentioned in the statute, notably evidence and appellate pro-
cedure?15
The provision for reporting the united rules to Congress was
probably modeled upon the provision of the English Supreme
Court of Judicature Act requiring the laying before Parliament
of the English Rules of Court. 6 It was apparently designed to
still Congressional opposition; but it had no apparent effect either
in lessening the earlier opposition or in adding to the later favor
accorded the legislation. Its interpretation would seem clear.
No action by Congress is called for to make the rules effective;
and no action can affect the rules save as new legislation, of like
dignity to the Act itself, is passed in the usual manner.
While power to amend the rules is not explicitly given by the
Act of 1934, yet it would seem that power initially to establish
rules carries with it, by necessary implication, the power to make
changes as occasion or necessity may require. Furthermore, the
original grants of rule-making authority to the Court contained
such continuing power; and the Act of 1934 can properly be con-
strued as at least restorative of so much of the general power
as was withdrawn by the Conformity Act of 1872." s Perhaps
15 See note 2, supra, especially Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule-
Making Power Granted U. S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise
(1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 404.
IG x92, x5 & 16 GEO. V, C. 49, §§ 99(5), 212. See 53 ANNUAL PRACTICE (1935)
2409, 2439; RosENBAV, op. cit. supra note xi, at 26.
17 Text writers now assert inherent power in the courts to control their own
procedure, without regard for legislative action, and some cases are relied on as
tending to sustain such power. Whatever is the force of the argument thus pre-
sented, it is perhaps doubtful that it will be held to afford support for the power
of the Supreme Court to regulate other federal courts than itself, particularly in
view of the general assumption from the beginning of our history that Congress
possesses such power.
38 See Section i7 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Permanent Process Act of
1792, and the Act of 1842, notes 26-28, infra. From the effect of this later Act, the
Conformity Act of 1872, note 5, supra, removed actions at law, and the statute,
as restricted, became Rev. STAT. (1878) §§ 913, 917, 28 U. S. C. §§ 723, 730 (1935).
The Act of 1934 in effect repeals the Conformity Act as of the date when the new
rules take effect. See also p. 1315, infra.
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more question arises as to whether amendments of the "united
rules," or new rules supplementing them, must be reported to
Congress. While caution might suggest that they be so reported,
it seems possible to argue that under the statute only the "unit-
ing" of the rules need be reported, and that since such union is
a single act accomplished at one time, later changes need not be
so reported. This last construction would avoid delay; and de-
lay in making some amendments or additions might be embar-
rassing.
The power to supersede all inconsistent laws is a new and ex-
tensive grant, 9 but one most effective to supersede the Conformity
Act, its vestiges, and its exceptions and limitations. That power
is expressly made applicable to rules governing actions at law.
Does it apply also to those rules when united with the equity
rules and to the resulting "united rules"? It surely continues
to apply to rules governing law actions, or else the Conformity
Act will continue unaffected by the side of an attempted single
procedure, with results both ludicrous and not susceptible of
rational interpretation. If the power does not also apply to the
united rules -if a part of a single procedure has one effect on
existing laws and the remaining part has a different effect - cer-
tain anomalies probably tending to prevent such union will de-
velop. The attempted union then becomes abortive by virtue
of a chance defect, since those statutes affecting equity procedure
which would by assumption still remain in effect were designed
to further a flexible procedure, not to restrict it. Examples may
illustrate the point. If the new rules should provide a broader
power of amendment than is now afforded by statute,"0 would
they be applicable only to "law" actions in a procedure where
law and equity are, by the new rules, united? Further, would
the united rules, whose raison d'gtre is to effect a single procedure,
supersede the Law and Equity Act of i9' ,21 which provided
19 For a similar rule-making power, see Wis. STAT. (1935) § 251.18, cited note ii,
Supra.
20 1 STAT. 9, (i789), 28 U. S. C. § 777 (I935), and see also § 767, with which
compare Rules 5, 22, and 70 of Preliminary Draft, supra note io. As to issuing of
process and instituting suit, compare 36 STAT. 1167 (19i), 28 U. S. C. § 721 (1935),
with Rules 3 and 4 of Preliminary Draft.
21 38 STAT. 956 (I915), 28 U. S. C. §§397, 398 (1935), with which compare
Rule 2 and other rules passim of Preliminary Draft, supra note io.
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(a) that if an action was brought on the wrong side of the court
the pleadings could be amended to make them conform to the
proper practice, and (b) that equitable defenses could be inter-
posed in actions at law? Would rules embodying provisions on
pre-trial examination supersede the old federal statutes on mode
of proof 22 only in "claw " actions and leave actions in "equity"
subject to them? And if a simple method to perfect an appeal is
prescribed, such as the service and filing of a notice of appeal,
rather than by petition for appeal, allowance of appeal, and
citation, as now contemplated by the federal statutes,23 would
the simplified method apply only to "law" actions? To ask
these and many similar questions is to indicate the result that is
most desirable and in accordance with a realistic interpretation
of the Act, namely, that the power in question applies also to
the united rules.
Discussion of the construction of the Act among commentators
has also concerned its applicability to matters of evidence, to the
demonstration, it is believed, of the Court's power to act in this
field.
24
Turning now to the problem of rule-making power in matters
of appellate procedure, it should be noted that many of the pres-
ent equity rules deal with matters of review, not only with the
preparation of the record for the appeal, but also with the effect
of error and like matters.25 Unless such power exists at least to
a like extent as that already possessed with reference to actions
22 REv. STAT. (1878) §§ 86I, 862, 28 U. S. C. §§ 635, 637 (1935), and the ex-
ceptions thereto conveniently grouped in 28 U. S. C. §§ 639-48 (1935); cf. Rules
31-41 of Preliminary Draft, supra note io.
23 See 45 STAT. 54 (1928), 28 U. S. C. § 288 (I935); 45 STAT. 54, 466 (1928),
28 U. S. C. §§861a, 861b; Rv. STAT. (1878) §§998, 1004, 28 U. S. C. §§867,
872 (1935), and other similar statutes; ci. Rule 72, of Preliminary Draft, supra
note io.
24 See Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 622; ci. Sunderland, supra note i5; Sweeney, Federal
or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts (1932) 27 ILL. L. R v. 394, 398;
Wickes, supra note 2, at 23-25. See also Rule 50 of Preliminary Draft. If the Act
does not apply, then a curious situation may result, since the admissibility of evidence
in actions at law is now determined by the construction given one or the other of
the Conformity Acts (Conformity Act or Rules of Decisions Act), and in suits
in equity by general principles of jurisprudence.
25 See Equity Rules 46, 701 (as amended Nov. 25, 1935), 72, 75-77, and
Supreme Court Rule 8, with which compare Rules 50, 57, 66, 68, 70, 72-75 of
Preliminary Draft, supra note io.
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in equity, there will be serious omissions in the new rules com-
pared to the existing equity rules; the question how far the rules
can prescribe the content and form of the appellate record will
at least be in doubt; and one of the most complicated and criti-
cized parts of federal practice will be left untouched. Unless, too,
the power extends to the point of permitting such regulation as
will make unnecessary the continued separation of law and equity
on appeal, that union which we have seen to be one of the main
objectives of the legislation will be largely prevented. The con-
clusions, to be now considered in some detail, may be stated:
that from the beginning of our judicial history the Supreme
Court has had power to govern appellate procedure; that this was
an express power when the circuit court was the only federal
court of review other than the Supreme Court; that it remained
clearly implied when the circuit court lost its character as an
appellate court and later was abolished; and that its scope, as
now exercised, is in accordance with this history, with the im-
port of federal legislation, and with the practical necessities of
the situation. The Act of 1934 , construed in the light of this
background, supports and supplements such power; indeed, it
will be to a considerable extent ineffective without it.
The First Judiciary Act of 1789 gave power to "all the said
courts of the United States . . . to make and establish all the
necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said
courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the
United States." 6 The Permanent Process Act of 1792 subjected
the law, equity, and admiralty practice "to such alterations and
additions as the said courts [circuit and district] respectively shall
in their discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the su-
preme court of the United States shall think proper from time to
time by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning
the same." 2 7 That power was reaffirmed in 1842 in very broad
terms giving the Supreme Court "full power and authority, from
time to time, to prescribe and regulate and alter " forms of process
and pleading, "the forms and modes of taking and obtaining evi-
dence," and certain other specified details, and "generally to
26 Section z7, 1 STAT. 83 (1789).
27 3 STAT. 275, 276 (1792). The first Process Act, i STAT. 93 (1789), which was
temporary in character, but was reenacted in 179o and i791, i STAT. 123 (179o), 1
STAT. i01 (z791), did not contain any general provision relative to rule making.
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regulate the whole practice of the said [district and circuit]
courts, so as to prevent delays, and to promote brevity and suc-
cinctness in all pleadings and proceedings therein, and to abolish
all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit therein." 2 8
These grants of rule-making power extended as a matter of
fact to all the appellate courts then existing in the national sys-
tem. From the beginning the Supreme Court itself had its prin-
cipal jurisdiction as a court of review and the only other appellate
court was the circuit court, which was, in addition to a court of
original jurisdiction, an important court of review for district
court judgments. All district court judgments and decrees in
admiralty, and in law and equity, could be appealed to the circuit
court when the matter in dispute was over $300 in admiralty, and
over $50 in the other cases, subject to writ of error to the Supreme
Court, when the matter in controversy exceeded $2000 (later
$5000) in value.2" It was only natural for the rule-making power
to be given to the Supreme Court, for the circuit courts originally
were to be manned largely by Supreme Court Justices. At first
28 5 STAT. 518, § 6 (1842). It may be interesting to note that some authority
to prescribe rules in criminal cases might well be found in § 6 when it is read in
conjunction with the other sections of the Act. The First Judiciary Act, extremely
vague and ambiguous on criminal procedure, has been construed to warrant an
implication that "the law by which . . . the admissibility of testimony in criminal
cases must be determined, is the law of the state, as it was when the courts of
the United States were established by the Judiciary Act of i789." United States v.
Reid, 12 How. 360, 363 (U. S. i85i), discussed by Leach, State Law of Evidence
in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 554, 555 et seq. The character of
conformity here is static and analogous to that for civil procedure at law, and
hence the grant of rule-making authority, which is extremely broad, might have
been construed as authority to modernize both criminal and law procedures. Cf.
Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 277 (1895). See also Funk v. United States, 290
U. S. 371 (1933), and Wolfle v. United States, 291 U. S. 7 (2934), which have re-
pudiated the static doctrine in the field of criminal evidence. But if such authority
was then given, its value has become academic today, because in the appellate field
of criminal procedure the Supreme Court has recently been given power to prescribe
appellate rules and rules have been promulgated under Act of Feb. 24, 1933, c.
119, 47 STAT. 904, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 723a (1935) ; and the remaining area
of criminal procedure has been so largely preEmpted by federal statutes that at this
late date a set of criminal rules for the district courts would have little value unless
a statute were to be enacted providing that such rules were to supersede any laws
inconsistent with them.
20 1 STAT. 83, 84, §§ 21, 22 (1789). See FRA rnURTER &uND LANDis, Taa Busi-
NESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) ix, 87, 229. Compare the somewhat anal-
ogous present appellate jurisdiction of the district courts over orders of United
States commissioners in cases arising under the Chinese exclusion laws, 36 STAT.
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these courts consisted of two Supreme Court Justices and one dis-
trict judge; later they could be held by a single judge. Except
for the "Midnight Judges" appointed in i8oi, under the law
repealed in 1802 at the instigation of the Jefferson Administra-
tion, no separate circuit judges were authorized until 1869. Even
thereafter and down to the abolition of the circuit courts in 19 12,
these courts were largely manned by district judges, one judge
often holding a circuit and a district court successively at the
same sitting.80
None of the rule-making power over appellate procedure thus
acquired by the Supreme Court was withdrawn by the Act of
z891 which created the circuit courts of appeals and gave to each
one power to establish rules for the conduct of its business. 1 The
rule-making power conferred upon the circuit courts of appeals
was similar in character and did not exceed the power which the
circuit courts had possessed, and remained subject to the appellate
rule-making power which the Supreme Court had been given over
the district and circuit courts." The circuit courts of appeals
have recognized this. Their original and subsequent rules have
been modeled upon the Supreme Court rules and in general may
be said to deviate from such rules only in so far as their peculiar
jurisdiction requires."
1094 (19I,), 28 U. S. C. §49 (1935), over the findings of referees as to rights of
way in Indian lands, 32 STAT. 50, § 23 (1902), 25 U. S. C. § 314 (1935) (appeal
de novo), and over criminal proceedings before certain commissioners. See Domr,
FEDERAL JURIsDICTION AND PRoCEDuRE (1928) 127.
30 See FRAN RTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 29, at 1I, 12, 18, 87.
31 For the establishment of the circuit courts of appeals, see Act of March 3,
X891, c. 517, 26 STAT. 826. See 26 STAT. 826, § 2 (1891), 28 U. S. C. § 219 (1935),
for the grant of rule-making power to these courts.
32 Compare the language of § 2 of the Act of 189i, cited note 31, supra, with
§ I7 of the judiciary Act of 1789, cited note 26, supra, and § 7 of the Act of March 2,
1793, i STAT. 335 (1793), 28 U. S. C. § 731 (1935) (grant of rule-making power to
the several courts of the United States). See Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Standard
Asphalt & Rubber Co., discussed at pp. 1317-18, infra.
33 For their original rules, see i5o Fed. XXV et seq. Rule 8 provided: "The
practice shall be the same as in the Supreme Court of the United States, as far as the
same shall be applicable." Compare, e.g., Rules Io (Bill of Exceptions), 12 (Objec-
tions to Evidence in the Record), 13 (Supersedeas and Cost Bonds), i4 (Writs of
Error, Appeals, Return and Record), 15 (Translations), 16 (Docketing Cases), z8
(Certiorari [for diminution of the record]), 19 (Death of a Party), 24 (Briefs), 25
(Oral Arguments), 28 (Opinions of the Court), 30 (Interest), 31 (Costs), with
General Rules of the Supreme Court [BLATCMrORID, RULES AND STATISTICS OF UNITED
STATES COURTS (1884)], Rules 4 (Bill of Exceptions), 13 (Objections to Evidence in
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The Conformity Act of 1872 4 removed the procedure of the
district courts in actions at law from the control of the Supreme
Court by providing that it should conform in each district to the
local state practice. Consequently the rule-making Act of 1842
cited above, came to be limited as it now is "to the whole prac-
tice, to be used, in suits in equity or admiralty, by the district
courts.""5 But it was well settled that the Conformity Act did
not apply to matters of appellate review. This is pointed out
in cases which also show that appellate procedure not expressly
governed by statutes or rules is determined by methods derived
from " the common law" or "ancient English statutes," i.e., that
neither statutes nor rules afford a complete appellate system.
Thus, in Chateaugay Ore & Iron Co., Petitioner,36 it is said:
"The manner or the time of taking proceedings as a foundation for the
removal of a case by a writ of error from one Federal court to another
is a matter to be regulated exclusively by acts of Congress, or, when they
are silent, by methods derived from the common law, from ancient Eng-
lish statutes, or from the rules and practices of the courts of the United
States."
The Act of 1934, therefore, in a very real sense restores that
segment of rule-making power (affecting actions at law prior to
judgment) which had been taken away by the Conformity Act.
It did, however, make the two important additions previously
stated, namely, the provision at the end of Section i that laws in
conflict with the rules shall be of no further force or effect, and
the entire Section 2 authorizing the uniting of the rules for cases
in equity with those in actions at law "so as to secure one form
of civil action and procedure for both."
the Record), 29 (Supersedeas), 8 (Writ of Error, Return and Record), ii (Transla-
tions), 9 (Docketing Cases), 34 [Certiorari (for diminution of the record)], rg
(Death of a Party), 21 (Briefs), 22 (Oral Arguments), 25 (Opinions of the Court),
23 (Interest), 24 (Costs). In many cases the rules were identical. Comparison
today presents much the same similarity. For a convenient grouping of the
present rules of the circuit courts of appeals and of the Supreme Court, see
SimxNs, FEDERAL PRAcT cE (Rev. ed. 1934) 075-94, 1129-49.
84 17 STAT. i96 (1872), 28 U. S. C. § 724 (1935).
35 REv. STAT. (1878) § 9,7, 28 U. S. C. § 730 (1939).
36 128 U. S. 544, 555 (I888). See also St. Clair v. United States, E54 U. S. 134,
'53 (1894) ; West v. East Coast Cedar Co., X13 Fed. 737, 741 (C. C. A. 4th, r902) ;
Detroit United Ry. v. Nichols, 165 Fed. 289, 294, 295 (C. C. A. 6th, 198); Boat-
men's Bank v. Trower Bros. Co., I81 Fed. 804, 8o6 (C. C. A. 8th, 19io). Com-
pare Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 318 (i919): "The Conformity Act by its
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Much of this statutory history down to 1895 is traced in
Hudson v. Parker,37 where the Court held of its then Rule 36,
concerning admission of a convicted person to bail after a writ of
error had been taken, that it
"was adopted by this court under and pursuant to its power to make
rules, prescribing the forms of writs and process, and regulating the
practice upon appeals or writs of error; and was so framed as to give
effect to the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the act of 18gi, in the
manner most consistent with the provisions of the various acts of Con-
gress concerning the same matter." 88
Two Justices who dissented expressly agreed as to the rule-making
power and disagreed only as to the meaning of the rule.
In accordance with this authority, the Supreme Court has pro-
mulgated rules dealing with appellate procedure, and a consider-
able body of case law, discussing and enforcing them, has de-
veloped in both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts of
appeals. The most important of these rules are Equity Rules 46,
70Y2 (amended Nov. 25, 1935), 75(a)-(c), 76, and 77, and the
Supreme Court Rules, of which Rule 8 dealing with assignments
of error and Rule 9 dealing with bills of exception in law cases
are particularly illustrative of this power. Equity Rule 46 pro-
hibits reversal of a decree for exclusion of evidence unless the
court is clearly of opinion that material prejudice will result from
affirmance. It is a forerunner of the general statute of Feb. 26,
i919, providing that on the hearing of any appeal, in any case,
civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examina-
tion of the entire record "without regard to technical errors, de-
fects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties." 3 Equity Rule 7o 2 deals with findings, and Rules
75-77 prescribe the form of record on appeal, including the re-
express terms refers only to proceedings in District (and formerly Circuit) Courts
and has no application to appellate proceedings either in this court or in the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Such proceedings are governed entirely by the acts of Con-
gress, the common law, and the ancient English statutes." This case dealt with the
effect of the statute, Act of Feb. 26, igig, c. 48, 40 STAT. 1181, 28 U. S. C. § 391
(1935), directing judgment on appeal on the entire record without regard to
technical errors; it held that this statute, rather than the local Virginia practice,
governed.
37 156 U. S. 277 (1895).
88 Id. at 284.
39 40 STAT. 1181 (1919), 28 U. S. C. § 39X (X935).
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quirement in 75b that the testimony must be reduced to narrative
form for the purposes of review.
Without question these rules apply in the Supreme Court itself,
and govern appeals from the district courts to the Supreme Court.
Power of that Court to make regulations for the dispatch of its
own business is inherent, and is specified by the statutes cited.
But to prevent an impossible burden of litigation on the Supreme
Court, an appeal of right directly to the Supreme Court is avail-
able in but very limited situations; the great majority of appeals
are to the circuit courts of appeals, and from there to the Supreme
Court by permission only.40 To limit the Equity and Supreme
Court rules concerning appeals, and dealing with the form of the
record and similar matters, to appeals only to the Supreme Court
would be utterly impracticable, for it might well require, in cases
appealed to the circuit courts of appeals and then carried by ap-
peal or certiorari to the Supreme Court, an entirely new record
contrary to the explicit mandate of the Act of Feb. 13, 1911, "An
Act To diminish the expense of proceedings on appeal and writ
of error or of certiorari." 41 It would also make difficult of at-
tainment, if not impossible, any uniformity in federal appellate
procedure, and thus render even more occult to the bar a pro-
cedure already most involved and as to which simplification is
demanded. The decisions of the Supreme Court enforcing these
rules and those of the circuit courts of appeals accepting them
have, therefore, reached both the logical and the desirable con-
clusion.
A leading case is Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Standard Asphalt
& Rubber Co.,42 followed also in Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v.
American Valve and Meter Co." Here the Supreme Court held
40 FRANaEuRTER An LAsNis, op. cit. supra note 29, at 255 et seq.; Frankfurter
and Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judcary Act of 1925 (1928) 42 HARV.
L. REv. i. See also the later articles by Frankfurter and associates in succeeding
volumes of the HARvARm LAW RlviEw. E.g., (1932) 46 id. 226, 233, (I935) 49 id.
68, 73, 75.
41 36 STAT. 9O1 (I9II), 28 U. S. C. §§ 865, 866 (i935).
42 275 U. S. 372, 387 (1928) (" the appellant should be required, as one of the
terms of the remission, to pay into the Court of Appeals five thousand dollars for
the benefit of the appellee by way of reimbursing it for counsel fees and expenses
incurred in securing the elimination of the irregular and objectionable statement of
the evidence; and also to pay, as one of such terms, the costs in this Court and
those in the Court of Appeals up to the time our mandate reaches that Court.").
42 276 U. S. 305 (1928) (costs divided, since each party was equally guilty of
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that Equity Rule 75b, requiring reduction of testimony to the
narrative form for the record on review, should be enforced by
the circuit courts of appeals. It was also held that the Act of
Feb. 13, I911," which provides that the transcript shall contain,
inter alia, " such part or abstract of the proofs as the rules of such
circuit court of appeals may require, and in such form as the Su-
preme Court of the United States may by rule prescribe," did not
withdraw from the Supreme Court the power of regulation on
which Equity Rule 75b depends. Many cases in the circuit courts
of appeals have subsequently enforced the rule, at times with
much severity. 5 The Supreme Court has also directed enforce-
ment by the circuit courts of appeals of its own similar rule,
Rule 8, which requires a narrative statement of testimony in bills
of exception in actions at law. 6
violating the rule). The Court's view exemplified in the Barber Asphalt Paving
Co. case and this case had been expressed much earlier. See Newton v. Con-
solidated Gas Co., 258 U. S. i65, 173, 174 (1922) ; City of Houston v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 259 U. S. 318, 325 (1922).
44 36 STAT. 90I, § i (i91i), 28 U. S. C. § 865 (1935).
45 E.g., Deitel v. Reich-Ash Corp., 57 F.(2d) 708 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) (only half
the costs for the record allowed) ; In re Meifert, 57 F.(2d) 861 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) ;
Sommer v. Rotary Lift Co., 66 F.(2d) 809 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1933) (submission vacated
and case remanded for restatement); Trust Co. v. Gault, 69 F.(2d) 133 (C. C. A.
5th, 1934) (costs charged to client and solicitor); First Nat. Bank v. Bonner, 74
F.(2d) 139 (C. C. A. ioth, 1934) (counsel severely admonished).
46 Alexander v. Cosden Pipe Line Co., 290 U. S. 484, 490, 491 (I934); Hursh v.
Killits, 58 F.(2d) 903 (C. C. A. gth, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 640 (1932)
(adopting the same attitude toward a verbose record in a law action as the Supreme
Court had earlier adopted in the equity case of Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v.
Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co.); see Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Mellon, 276
U. S. 386, 391 (1928) (Supreme Court Rule 4 there referred to is now Rule 8).
For cases requiring the court to make findings as provided in Equity Rule 7o,
see Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 213 (1934); Edwards
v. Holland Banking Co., 75 F.(2d) 713 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 75 F.(2d) 880 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), cert. denied,
295 U. S. 754 (1935); Humphrey v. Helgerson, 78 F.(2d) 484 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935)
[quoting with approval Roosevelt v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 7o F.(2d) 939,
945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934): "The Equity Rules have the force and effect of law, and
neither the District Court nor this Court has power to adopt a practice incon-
sistent with them or to disregard their provisions."].
Equity Rule 46 prohibiting reversal only when material prejudice has resulted
must be complied with. Unkle v. Wills, 281 Fed. 29, 34 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922);
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Muther, 288 Fed. 283, 289 (C. C. A. ist, 1923),
cert. denied, 263 U. S. 703 (1923); Bowmaster v. Carroll, 23 F.(2d) 825 (C. C. A.
8th, 1928).
Failure to comply with the purpose of Supreme Court Rule 9 on assignments
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Thus, if the proposed new rules do not contain at least as much
material on appellate review as now exists, a gap will be left, and
the practice will be thrown into serious confusion. At the very
least, the rules should cover the same ground as did the Equity
Rules.
But the grant of authority in the Act of 1934 to unite the law
and equity procedure creates a further and most important prob-
lem. Probably the greatest obstacle to this union, next to the
question of jury trial, is the traditional difference in method of
review of equity and law cases.47  Unless rules of appellate pro-
cedure can be provided, it will not be possible to "unite the gen-
of error will, in the future, be sufficient ground for dismissal of an appeal. Local
167, Internat. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 29X U. S. 293, 296
(1934) (there were more than 250 specifications of error, when actually there were
but 5 points urged); cf. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U. S. 86 (1932)
(assignment of error too indefinite to present a constitutional question).
In summary it may be said that rules of practice in the lower courts will not
be permitted to conflict with any rule promulgated by the Supreme Court. Bank
of the United States v. White, 8 Pet. 262, 269 (U. S. r834); Los Angeles Brush
Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U. S. 703 (1927); Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co.,
6x F.(2d) 736, 738 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied sub nom. Berenson v. Wood-
bury, 289 U. S. 740 (1933). See DoBiE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 902, on the
Supreme Court's power to make federal appellate rules. Compare Godfree v. Peak,
30 F.(2d) 988 (App. D. C. 1929), requiring the police court to conform in sub-
stance to the rule on a bill of exceptions of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia.
Rules, of course, may not enlarge or restrict jurisdiction or abrogate or modify
substantive law. Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia
Steamboat Co., 263 U. S. 629, 635, 636 (1924).
-1 Legislation has almost assimilated the procedures for review into one type.
First, the taking of an appeal when a writ of error was proper, or vice versa, was
made harmless; then in 1928 the writ of error was abolished and the appeal sub-
stituted therefor. The substance of the review has, however, not been changed.
Clark and Moore, supra note 2, at 430 et seq. For discussion of the 1928 legislation
abolishing the writ of error, see (X928) 41 HAv. L. RMv. 673; Frankfurter and
Landis, supra note 40, at 27 et seq. There are at least three solutions in dealing
with the substance of review. (All, of course, would give the same weight to a
jury's verdict or finding in a law action as is guaranteed by the Seventh Amend-
ment.) The first solution is to retain the present federal system of review, viz.,
that in jury-waived law cases, the findings of fact shall have the same effect as the
verdict of a jury in an action at law, while in equity cases, the findings of fact shall
be reviewable as to the weight of the supporting evidence as well as the sufficiency.
This perpetuates the procedural distinction between law and equity. A second
solution is to provide the same type of review in jury-waived cases at law as we
now have in equity. A third solution is to provide that findings of fact by a court
shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury. The second solution assimilates
all jury-waived cases to the equity review, while the third solution assimilates the
review to a review at law.
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eral rules prescribed by it [the Court] for cases in equity with
those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and
procedure for both." 48 It is not without significance that in this
section of the Act there is no mention of, or limitation to, the dis-
trict courts as there is in Section i, which restores the former
rule-making power as to actions at law. The mandate is to unite
the rules - i.e., all the rules - to secure the one form of pro-
cedure, without limitation of the one form to the district courts.
A further mandate is to be found in the Law and Equity Act of
1915, which, as Chief Justice Taft pointed out in Liberty Oil Co.
v. Condon National Bank, 9 went far towards adopting the code
union of law and equity actions. The second section of the Law
and Equity Act provided for the filing of equitable defenses in
actions at law and that
"Review of the judgment or decree entered in such case shall be
regulated by rule of court. Whether such review be sought by writ of
error or by appeal the appellate court shall have full power to render
such judgment upon the records as law and justice shall require." "0
In American Cyanamid Co. v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co.,"'
the court said:
"Whether an appeal may be taken immediately from a refusal to
stay the proceedings at law as if from the refusal of an injunction is
still important, and we think a matter within the rule-making power
given by the statute. An intent to accommodate appellate procedure to
the exigencies of the new practice is plain. No rule appearing to have
been promulgated, this purpose of the statute can be served only by
recognizing a discretion to be exercised in each case until a rule shall be
established."
With the complete unification of law and equity now contemplated,
response to this mandate is more than ever necessary. Appellate
rule making should therefore proceed to the extent of making
effective the contemplated union.
A final matter which has been previously referred to deserves
further consideration. It concerns the power given by Section i
of the Act of 1934 to supersede all laws inconsistent with the rules
48 See § 2 of the Act of 1934, cited note x, supra.
49 26o U. S. 235 (1922); see Note (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 474.
5o 38 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. § 398 ('935).
51 62 F.(2d) IOI8, 1020 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 736 (1933).
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when promulgated. Since this provision appears only in that part
of the Act which authorizes general rules in the district courts in
civil actions at law, a strict interpretation of the statute might
hold it limited to those rules only. But it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to carry out the authorization to provide for one form
of procedure, if, after the rules have been "united ", part of the
effect of each of many of the rules is still to be controlled by stat-
utes, while the other part is not, with the result that the same rule
operates differently in actions formerly legal and in actions for-
merly equitable. In view of the long struggle since i912 to secure
the adoption of the Act as a definite reform and simplification of
procedure and the continued emphasis since 1922 upon the unit-
ing of the federal law and equity actions, it is clear that such a
result was certainly not contemplated by the framers of the leg-
islation. They wished particularly (a) to do away with the Con-
formity Act and all its appendages, including both the federal
legislation which restricted and that which authorized conform-
ity, and (b) to make possible a simplified united procedure com-
parable to the best state practice under the codes. All laws in
conflict with the rules adopted to carry out these ends should,
therefore, be of no further force or effect. The "general rules "
in actions at law of the first section are not to be superseded or
overturned, but merge into and become a part of the "united
rules " of the second section. The powers pertinent to such gen-
eral rules must, therefore, pass to the united rules or else the whole
force of the second section is lost.
The question may be raised as to the extent of such a power to
supersede existing statutes as to appellate review. The answer
is the same as that to the like question involving pre-trial and trial
rules, and is given in the statute, namely, that only matters of
procedure can be thus controlled and the rules "shall neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any liti-
gant." The rules can and should, however, provide that issues
between litigants may be presented for review as simply and di-
rectly as, under the united procedure, they may be presented for
trial in the court below. Anything less than this marks a substan-
tial defeat of the objectives of the Act and of the great hopes held
out for it over many years by its ardent supporters.
Charles E. Clark.
YALE SCHOOL OF LAW.
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